UNEXPLAINABLE ON GROUNDS OTHER
THAN RACE*
DAVID KAIRYS**

INTRODUCTION

Each new pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the American
dilemma-race-creates a hailstorm of analysis and turns the
attention of the legal community, and the community at large, to
basic questions about justice and the meaning of American freedom,
democracy, and equality. This has been so for decades, if not
centuries. Three decisions on racial issues handed down at the end
of the Court's 1994-1995 Term' were no exceptions, heralding for
some the dawn of a new conservative paradigm on race.2
On such occasions, analyses in both legal and popular venues tend
to focus on the particular area of equal protection at issue in the
recent decision and on comparisons to earlier decisions and principles in that area. A voting rights case prompts discussion of voting
rights, an affirmative action case prompts discussion of affirmative
action, and so on. This is useful and important, but an analysis that
ends there misses the Court's overall perspective and approach to
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equality. Is there, as the Court regularly proclaims, one approach and

one set of rules and assumptions applicable to all equal protection
claims? Or are there differing rules, assumptions, and approaches;
and, if so, what determines which are applied in particular cases? To
address such questions, one must look across the range of various
equal protection issues and cases.
In recent writings, I identified three major types of equal protection
race cases-challenges to discrimination against minorities, challenges
to affirmative action, and challenges to race-conscious remedial
measures. Looking at the results and reasoning in the three types of
cases, I concluded that the Court's conservative majority has developed a "dual system": two distinct sets of rules, assumptions, and
approaches-one that makes it nearly impossible for a discrimination
3
claim to succeed, another that makes it quite easy.
Which of these different sets of rules, assumptions, and approaches
applies in a particular case depends on the race of the persons
claiming discrimination, but not in a way that is immediately obvious.
Conventional wisdom starts with the assumption that African
Americans have been favored by antidiscrimination law, which should
be uniformly applied irrespective of race so that whites receive equal
treatment. In this view, African Americans who claim discrimination
have received either too much relief from the courts or a level of
relief that has not been extended to whites, and affirmative action
should be prohibited as reverse discrimination. 4 This is how the
Court has addressed the question, including a discussion of it in one
of the major cases of last Term.5 Another view, usually put forward

3. See DAVID KAIRyS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTIcE FOR SOME 129-45 (1993) [hereinafter
KAIRYS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME] (recognizing dual meaning of equality through
examination of Fourteenth Amendment cases); David Kairys, Race Trilogy, 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 1,
1 (1994) [hereinafter Kairys, Race TWiogy] (identifying three major types of Fourteenth
Amendment race cases and discussing Court's "tendency to apply different standards to claims
of racial discrimination" depending on which group is disfavored); see also David Kairys,
PrejudicialRestraint: Race and the Supreme CourA TIKUN, May/June 1991, at 37 (discussing
different definitions of equality).
4. See, ag., Lily Dizon, Under the Skin, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1993, atAl ("Almost half of the
people polled-47%--said they believe anti-discrimination laws have gone too far."); Ernest
Lefever, The Dangerof Quotas, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, atA21 (noting "legal preferences for
ethnic minorities and women"); Paul Roberts, The Rise of the New Inequality, WALL ST.J., Dec. 6,
1995, atA20 (asserting that white males are disadvantaged because "people have different rights
under the law based on their race and gender"); Donna St. George, A Simmering PoliticalBattle;
Backlash Against Affirmative Action Becoming More Visibk, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 19, 1995,
at D1. Polls cited in these articles generally show majority opposition to "quotas" but acceptance
of affirmative action, although politicians and pundits regularly assume that there is widespread
opposition to affirmative action.
5. "'[T] he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.'" Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2100
(quoting City of Richmond v.JA Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)).
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by liberals, advocates either different rules or recognition within the
same rules of the different history and circumstances faced by whites
and racial minorities. This leads to vigorous protection of minorities
and permits affirmative action because of the history, current reality,
and lingering effects of discrimination against them.6
These two positions, which can fairly be characterized as conservative and liberal, assume that minorities have been favored or at least
treated the same as whites in the Court's equal protection decisions,
and go on to propose better treatment for whites or minorities,
respectively. Whatever the merits of their arguments for better
treatment, the focus here is the initial assumptions of both positions.
The dual system established by the Court over the last two decades
favors white people.
The race cases of last Term permit an elaboration of the dual
system thesis, presented in the form of a table that highlights the
different approaches, rules, and assumptions when whites and African
Americans claim discrimination. They also permit an explanation of
how the conservative majority has established a dual system based on
what is easily described as a single set of equality rules.
THE DUAL SYSTEM THESIS
Since the mid-1970s, discrimination claims brought by African
Americans and other minorities have run into a near impenetrable
brick wall: the purposefirl-discrimination rule:7 While lower federal
courts, applying principles and approaches developed in the 1960s
and early 1970s, sometimes granted relief to minorities, the occasions
on which the Supreme Court has done so are extremely rare and are
based primarily on other, overriding concerns. 8
6. See, eg., Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,565-67 (1990); Croson, 488 U.S.
at 528 (Marshallj., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist has adopted this argument as to gender
discrimination, but not as to racial discrimination. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 735 (1982) (Powell & Rehnquist,JJ., dissenting); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464, 466 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (RehnquistJ., dissenting). The
combination of the intermediate standard for gender discrimination and the principle that
affirmative action for any group be judged by the same standard as discrimination against that
group has made affirmative action for women easier than for African Americans, although the
higher standard for racial discrimination is based on the notion that it is socially and constitutionally worse.
7. Justice Blackmum, dissenting in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662
(1989), put it this way- "One wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimination-or, more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society,
or even remembers that it ever was."
8. The principal rare exceptions have been explicitly racial measures, mainly school
desegregation cases of which Jenkins is the latest retreat, and challenges to discriminatory jury
selection systems. But see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (affirming lower court
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The purposeful-discrimination doctrine is a hallmark of the
conservative judicial approach.' Starting from the premise that the
most serious social and institutional forms of racism have been
overcome, the proper role for the courts is seen as deference to
legislative authority and judicial restraint. Legal relief will be
considered if,
and only if, it can be proved that an action harmful to
a racial minority was undertaken for the specific purpose of discriminating rather than for some other purpose.
Most significantly, this proof of purposeful discrimination must be
presented before and as a pre-condition to any serious questioning or
scrutiny of the government's action. Even measures that have a
clearly harmful, particularized effect on minorities are now assumed
to be completely free from the influence of racial considerations, no
matter how extensive or unnecessary the harm may be, or how closely
the circumstances and context may fit historical patterns of racism.

If purposeful discrimination is not proved, the courts will not seriously
examine the government action at all: any legitimate-sounding,
generally stated purpose will simply be accepted.
There are many examples of this." Perhaps the clearest is City of

invalidation of at-large voting system that was part of pervasive pattern of exclusion of African
Americans from voting and politics).
The Court has in effect exempted jury challenges from the purposeful discrimination rule
while still employing the language of intentional discrimination. SeeDuren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
357 (1979) (finding prima fade case established by substantial underrepresentation traceable
to some aspect of jury selection system); Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493-94 (1977)
(holding that prima facie case established by substantial underrepresentation and system that
provides "opportunity to discriminate"). The Court has done this because, in addition to the
rights and interests of underrepresented persons and groups that are present in every equal
protection claim, actualjury representativeness, regardless of the intentions ofjury selection laws
or officials, is necessary to the integrity and legitimacy of jury verdicts and to fairness for
litigants. SeeArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266 n.13 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975).
See generally David Kairys et al.,Jury Representativeness: A Mandatefor Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL

L. REV. 776, 784-88, 786 n.64 (1977). The essentially impact-based rules applied in jury
challenges have benefited whites and men as well as minorities and women since the Court has
held that, because of the importance of actual representativeness, a challenger does not have
to have the underrepresented characteristic. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1990)
(holding that white defendant has standing to object to prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks from jury); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (holding
that fair cross-section requirement of Sixth Amendment cannot be satisfied if women are
systematically eliminated from jury panels); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1973)
(holding that male defendant had standing to assert claim that "exclusion of women from jury
service" deprived him of kind of factfinder to which he was constitutionally entitled).
9. The focus on government purpose is familiar in race discrimination cases. This focus
is also part of a trend, which I have called the purpose doctrine, that dominates recent
conservative decisions covering the whole range of civil rights and civil liberties. KAIRYS, WITH
LIBERTY ANDJUSTICE FOR SOME, supra note 3, at 183-86 (discussing "purpose doctrine" and how
it excuses constitutional violations unless victim can prove that government acted maliciously).
10. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 279 (1987) (stating that petitioner must
prove that decisionmakers in case acted with "discriminatory purpose" in order to prove Equal
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Memphis v. Greene," in which the city of Memphis erected a traffic
barrier between an all-white community, constructed before World
War II as a segregated development, and a neighboring black
community. 2 The city, claiming it acted only to further "traffic
safety,"13 closed a thoroughfare for the first time in its history,
violating in the process its own procedures and rules. 4 It also sold
a twenty-five foot wide strip of the street to two adjacent white
property owners, declaring in a city council resolution that the strip
was "closed to the public." 5 Closing the thoroughfare impeded the
black community's access to a public park and zoo that had been
segregated until 1963,16 caused inconvenience, potentially reduced
property values in the black community, and resembled, at least
symbolically, segregation, second-class citizenship, or even apartheid."
The Court accepted the city's general explanation that the street
was closed for safety related to traffic and to preserve the residential
character of the neighborhood. 8 The possibility of less extreme

Protection Clause violation); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124 (1981) (rejecting
plaintiffs' claim that state was conferring benefit on white citizens); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55,55 (1980) (identifying"racially discriminatory motivation" as necessary to challenge
electoral scheme that favored whites); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 230 (1976) (asserting
that purpose to discriminate must be present for successful Equal Protection Clause challenge);
see also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 718 (1974) (identifying need to establish boundary
lines for school districts formed with "purpose of fostering racial segregation"). The same
phenomena characterizes the Court's Title VII cases. See Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (requiring proof that challenged employment practices caused
disparate impact on employment ofworkers and accepting"business considerations" as sufficient
justification for such employment practices). SeegenerallyAlan Freeman, Anti-DiscriminationLaw:
The VVewfrom 1989, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, ch. 6 (David Kairys ed., 2d ed., 1990).
11. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
12. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 102-03 (1981).
13. Id. at 104 (stating that city's justifications for closing thoroughfare included reducing
traffic flow, increasing safety for children walking to local junior high school, and reducing
"traffic pollution" in residential area).
14. See id at 142-43 (Marshall,J., dissenting). The city required the unanimous consent of
all the adjoining property owners before a street could be closed to traffic (which had been
done previously to deadends, alleys and non-thoroughfares), but one white owner objected. Id.
The first round of city hearings proceeded without any notice to the black community, and at
later hearings their time for presentations was severely limited. Id. at 143 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
15. Id at 112-13 n.19. The majority acknowledged that this might include pedestrians as
well as cars. Id at 112-13 n.21.
16. Id at 102-03; see Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 534 (1963) (finding "an
unmistakable and pervasive pattern of local segregation").
17. Greene, 451 U.S. at 138 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (stating that majority ignored "plain and
powerful symbolic message" of barrier). The lead plaintiff, N.T. Greene, recalled in his
testimony being chased by police from the white community, in which blacks were not allowed.
The plaintiffs claimed that the street closure and barrier were a "badge of slavery" prohibited
by the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 124. This claim as well as all of the plaintiffs' other
claims were rejected by the Court. Id. at 128-29.
18. Id. at 119.
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traffic measures, such as reduction of speed limits or installation of
traffic control bumps, was of no import in Justice Stevens's majority
opinion. 9 Because the African-American neighborhood presented
"no evidence" of purposeful discrimination, the street closing could
not be seriously questioned or scrutinized."
Of course, some general, legitimate-sounding purpose often accompanies such actions or is available as a justification after the fact.
Unless there is a written confession of racist motivation, racist officials
and institutions are allowed by this analysis to adopt measures that
harm minorities without running into any legal obstacles. This rule
not only undercuts the constitutional prohibition of discrimination-which, contrary to public understanding, was faithfully enforced
for, at most, only
two decades-but has made purposeful discrimina21
tion quite easy.
The Court's affirmative action decisions, best exemplified by City of
Richmond v. fA. Croson Co.,22 purport to follow the same rule and
approach, but subject governmental actions to a detailed, searching
scrutiny aimed at, in the Court's words in Croson, "smok[ing] out"
racism. 23 The stated reason for this stark difference in approach was
that the affirmative action plan at issue set up an explicitly racial
24
classification.
Scrutiny of race-specific measures makes sense, but the conservative
Justices never adequately explained why they concluded that remedying racial discrimination or its lingering effects is an insufficient or
illegitimate governmental goal. Nor did they explain why measures
that seriously disadvantage minorities and even fit historic patterns of
racism, though not race-specific, merit no scrutiny at all.
Explicitly mentioning race-which any good-faith affirmative-action
plan would have to do and any bad-faith racist practice can easily
avoid-was established as the only circumstance requiring courts to
seriously scrutinize possibly discriminatory measures. Even strong
circumstantial evidence of purposeful discrimination against minorities has been regularly discounted or ignored, as in the "no evidence"
conclusion in the Greene case.
19. See id. at 152 n.17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reiterating testimony by city official that
street closing for traffic control purposes was unprecedented). Justice Stevens' recent votes in
race cases, including the three cases last Term focused on in this Essay, raise a question about
whether he would now vote as he did in Greene.
20. Id, at 126.
21. SeeAlan Freeman, LegitimatingRacialDiscriminationThrough Anti-DiscriminationLaw, 62
MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978).
22. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
23. City of Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
24. Id at 476-77.
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Nor is it clear what the Court in Croson meant by "racism" that
should be "smoke[d] out." The Richmond City Council did, in fact,
wish to help African Americans,25 much as other city governments
have sought-and were allowed-to provide economic and social
opportunities for other disadvantaged minorities. Unless we assume
the improbable-that there were no qualified African-American
contractors or subcontractors, despite the fact that they constituted
over half of the city's population 2 -- the plan did not give African
Americans an unfair advantage or preference, and did not harm
whites.27 Blacks simply gained access to a previously denied opportunity-less of a break than was provided to other previously excluded
groups by many of our large cities, which in some periods had police
or fire departments that were almost all Irish, Italian, or German
American.2 8 When white officials adopt measures that aid their own,
there is a strong presumption that they act for significant, legitimate
reasons unrelated to ethnicity or race; when African Americans do the
same, the Court's tendency is to call it racism.2 9
The Court's recent decisions in cases in which white plaintiffs
challenge measures designed to remedy past discrimination against
minorities fill out the picture, particularly because some of them do
not involve explicitly racial classifications. In Shaw v. Reno, ° for
example, the North Carolina legislature, seeking to comply with the
Voting Rights Act of 19651 and directives from the Bush administration Department ofJustice, created two majority-black congressional
districts out of its total of twelve. 2 Due to consistent racial bloc
25. See id at 528 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (stating that Richmond's actions were forthright
attempt "to confront the effects of racial discrimination in its midst").
26. id at 479, 495.
27. Some individual blacks got an opportunity they never had before, and some individual
whites were denied an advantage they previously had.
28. For example, Frank Rizzo rose to the top of the Philadelphia police department after
Italian Americans were brought into ranks previously dominated almost entirely by Irish and
German Americans. See generally SA PAOLANTONIO, FRANK RIZZO: THE LAST BIG MAN IN BIG
CTy AMERICA (1993).
29. See City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (referring to
"illegitimate uses of race"). The Court was specifically troubled by the black majority on the
Richmond city council that formulated and adopted the plan. Id. at 495-96. There is duplicity
here, given that the Court does not seem to view the race of white legislatures who help whites
as relevant. There is no reason to believe, however, that the result would be any different if the
council had been all white. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990)
(O'Connor,J., dissenting) (declaring that FCC's policies, which benefited minorities, indirectly
contributed to "an escalation of racial hostility and conflict").
30. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
31. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1989)).
32. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2817 (1993) (stating that Voting Rights Act of 1965
prohibits covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in voting in "standard practice, or
procedure absent federal authorization").
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voting by whites and the prior drawing of the districts, there had not
been any black member of Congress from North Carolina since
Reconstruction.3 3 The new apportionment resulted in two black
members of Congress from North Carolina, still less than the black
proportion of the state.'
Nevertheless, five white voters, who
suffered no harm and would seem to lack standing under the Court's
decisions regarding the standing of minority plaintiffs, challenged the
newly created districts."5
Although this reapportionment measure did not explicitly mention
race 36-- and therefore the evidence was, as in Greene, circumstantial-the Court analyzed it as a racial classification because of the
appearance of discrimination. The Court found the odd shape of one
of the majority-black districts 7 "bizarre"-."'unexplainable on
grounds other than race,"'" with an "uncomfortable resemblance to
political apartheid."39 Race-conscious redistricting as a remedy for
discrimination is not, the Court emphasized, necessarily unconstitutional, but the white plaintiffs should win if they prove at trial that the
purpose was to "segregate voters."4
The appearance of discrimination was irrelevant in Greene-and in
City of Mobile v. Bolden,41 where African Americans, who comprised
over a third of the population of Mobile, Alabama, challenged an atlarge electoral scheme that, combined with regular bloc voting by

33. I& at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 2818.
35. Id-at 2818-19. Standing requires an "injury in fact," a causal connection between the
injury and the challenged measure or conduct, and a likelihood that the injury can be redressed
by the relief requested. See, eg, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(outlining three elements of standing required by Constitution). The injury must be particular
to the plaintiffs; generalized social harms and the stigma of racial stereotyping-emphasized in
Shaw-have not been sufficient to confer standing on minority plaintiffs. See Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 754, 756 (1984) (stating that "asserted right to have the Government act in
accordance with law" and claim that measure "stigmatizes" a race are insufficient); see also Davis
v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129-34 (1986) (holding that threshold showing of discriminatory vote
dilution is required to show equal protection violation); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 104 (1983) (stating that respondent's assertion that "he may again be subject to an illegal
chokehold" is insufficient) (emphasis added). See generallyPamela Karlan, All Over the Map: The
Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 245 (1994); Frank P. Parker, The
Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting. A Critique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REV. 1 (1995)
(arguing that decision has "enormous consequences for minority voters seeking to overcome
decades of discrimination").
36. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2833 (1993) (indicating that measure only specified new
boundaries of state's 12 districts).
37. I& at 2818.
38. Id.at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977)).
39. Id. at 2827.
40. Id.at 2826.
41. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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whites, consistently resulted in an all-white city commission and a
white mayor.4 2 The plurality opinion admonished the African
American plaintiffs:4 "their freedom to vote has not been denied
or abridged by anyone;" the Constitution "does not entail the right to
have Negro candidates elected."'
Shaw dispels the plausibility of any claim to neutrality or consistency
in the conservative tendency in race discrimination cases to exercise
judicial restraint where blacks are disadvantaged and judicial activism
where whites are disadvantaged. The redistricting scheme was not
race-specific, its purpose and effect were to remedy a longstanding
disempowerment of black voters, and white voters were not harmed
as a group or individually. Yet, the Court responded with judicial
activism and moral repudiation.
The crux of the Croson and Shaw decisions is the assumption that
openly affirmative or remedial actions-even in response to conceded
discrimination-are racist or could mask racism. This assumption
comports with the notion of color-blindness that dominates the
current debate surrounding race and affirmative action, but it is a
complete inversion of the logic behind the Greene ruling, which
accepted, without question, non-racial rationales for a physical barrier
between white and black communities that lacked any sufficient,
legitimate justification. Surely the white-initiated physical barrier
between black and white communities approved in Greene more closely
resembles apartheid and segregation (and racism) than the attempt
to remedy a longstanding disenfranchisement of blacks repudiated in
Shaw.
The Court has reversed the social roles that shaped the history of
American racism: whites have become the presumed victims and
African Americans the presumed racists. To rationalize this reversal
of social roles, the Court has employed the history, language, and
moral force of the progressive struggle against racism. Thus, while
challenges to discrimination against minorities or women are greeted
with skepticism, deference to government officials, restraint and an
obliviousness to reality, affirmative action is an occasion to "smoke out
racism" and remedial redistricting draws a charge of "segregation."
In Shaw, the conservative Court appropriated even the history and
moral force of apartheid.

42. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980).
43. They were also quite critical ofJustice Marshall, who dissented. Id. at 75-80.
44. I& at 65.
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This analysis of cases across the range of the major areas of
discrimination law led to the dual system thesis:
The result is a dual system of equality rules that depend first and
foremost on which group in society has been disadvantaged by a
government measure challenged as discriminatory. Challenges to
measures that disadvantage blacks, other minorities, or women face
an inordinate burden to prove purposeful action, and the tendency
to ignore the appearance of discrimination or stereotyping or even
strong circumstantial proof; judicial restraint articulated as a
highest-level, general principle; and moral skepticism that doubts
that white men discriminate anymore and questions the credibility
and motives of challengers who claim otherwise. Challenges to
measures that disadvantage whites, even if there is no real harm
done, face a minimal burden, satisfied by circumstantial evidence,
the appearance of discrimination or stereotyping, or a remedial or
affirmative purpose, even if it is clearly a good-faith response to
conceded discrimination; judicial activism, with no discussion or
mention ofjudicial restraint; and moral repudiation drawing on the
history and symbols of the worst forms of racism. This is what we
now call equality.45
THE 1994-95 TERM DECISIONS
The 1994-1995 Term added a new case in each of the three major
areas and, most significantly, clarified and extended Croson and Shaw.
Missouri v. Jenkins46 continued the Court's retrenchment of
remedies for school desegregation. The conservative majority
rejected as impermissible a remedy for longstanding dejure discrimination that focused on improvement of urban schools to attract
predominantly white students from surrounding suburbs.4" In Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, actually integrating schools,
which he opposed at the outset, is less important than the time and
money expended.49 The inordinate burden of proof, rules, and
assumptions that characterize the Court's approach to challenges to

45. Kairys, Race Triogy, supranote 3, at 12.
46. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
47. In all three of these cases, the conservative majority consists of ChiefJustice Rehnquist
andJustices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
48. Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2040 (1995). Measures included salary increases
for all staff within the Kansas City school district and continuation of funding for remedial
education programs. Id.
49. See id at 2054. When a law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson, Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote a memorandum opposing what became the unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). David Savage, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST
SUPREME COURT, ch. 2 (1992).
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discrimination against African Americans are applied even though
there was undisputable purposeful discrimination."
This is the
unusual circumstance where purposeful discrimination was found,
because it was explicitly set out in state law, and local and state
authorities attempted to do something about it-improve their
schools for all pupils. The Court responded with activist intervention,
disdain, and rules and assumptions that reward government stonewalling, evasion, and stalling to avoid integration.
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,51 the Court applied Croson to
federal affirmative action programs,52 overruling Metro Broadcasting,
5 The Court held in Metro Broadcastingthat the federal
Inc. v. FCC."
government had broader constitutional authority than the states for
affirmative action. 4
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand stressed three
single-word principles. First, "skepticism" toward any explicit racial
classification, which covers good-faith affirmative action, but the
Court makes no mention of bad-faith discrimination against minorities.55 The Court's skepticism does not extend to non-explicit
measures that disadvantage minorities, even if they fit the historic
patterns of racism and discrimination that led to the Fourteenth
Amendment and to the modern jurisprudence of equality, on which
the conservative majority draws when whites are disadvantaged."
Second, "consistency," referring to the regular claim, disputed here,
that the rules, assumptions, and approaches in equal protection cases
have not depended on the "'race of those burdened.' 5 7 The
Court's point is that whites should get no less protection than African
Americans; my argument is that whites have received considerably
more protection.- There is a consistency in Miller, Shaw, and Bolden,
but it does not reside in any uniform rules or application of rules: in
all three, the Court maintains and legitimates an imbalance of
political and electoral power that favors whites. More generally, since

50. But see Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring) (referring to "alleged
constitutional violation"). Justice Thomas suggests that any further remedy for school
desegregation depends on a showing of continuing purposeful discrimination. Id. at 2062-63.
51. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
52. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2100 (1995).
53. 497 U.S. 547 (1989).
54. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 565-66 (1989).
55. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
56. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor did not include Shaw on her list of leading cases dealing
with non-explicit measures. Id. at 2105.
57. 1& at 2111 (quoting City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)).
58. Justice O'Connor starts with the unsubstantiated conventional wisdom that African
Americans have been favored, which is belied by the string of cases like Greene since 1976. To
her, consistency requires treating whites as favorably as blacks, rather than the converse.
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the mid-1970s, the Court's equal protection decisions have consistently maintained, enforced, and legitimized exclusive or excessive power
and privilege for white people. 9
Third, "'congruence,"' meaning "'equal protection analysis in the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment,"' so affirmative action programs established by Congress
should get the same strict scrutiny treatment as state affirmative action
programs." This last principle brings the conservative majority into
conflict with a recent precedent-Justice Brennan's majority opinion
in Metro Broadcasting.
The attack on Metro Broadcastingis revealing. The Court depicts
Metro Broadcastingas out of step with a seamless web of cases that
require the same equal protection standards in Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment cases.61 If this characterization were true-if the same
standards should be applied to congressional and state affirmative
action-Croson was wrongly decided: it should have followed the less
stringent test applied to congressional affirmative action in Fullilove v.
Klutznick.62 In Croson,Justice O'Connor announced for the conservative majority that strict scrutiny, rather than the lessor standard set out
in Fullilove, would be applied to state affirmative action.65 She
distinguished Fullilove-on which the Richmond city council had
literally based its plan,' thinking it was safe to do so because of what
the Court now calls "congruence"-on the specific ground that
Congress has broader authority for affirmative action than the
states.65
In any event, in Adarand the Court still had to deal with Metro
Broadcasting,a recently decided contrary case right on point. For this,
the conservative majority announced a substantially modified version
of stare dcisis. "Remaining true to an 'intrinsically sounder' doctrine

59. The only significant exception isjury discrimination cases, in which other concerns are
overriding. See supra note 8.
60. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,93 (1976)). Justices Scalia and Thomas,
concurring, go further. Justice Scalia would invalidate all explicit racial classifications. Id. at
2118 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas states emphatically that good intentions do not
excuse constitutional violations, id. at 2119, although he has decided that they do in a range of
other civil rights cases. See generaly KAIRYS, WrrH LIBERTY AND JUSMcE FOR SOME, supranote 3
(discussing role of intention and purpose in equal protection analysis).
61. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (referring to Court's decision in Metro Broadcastingas
surprising turn").
62. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
63. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).
64. Id. at 491. The language that the Richmond city council used to list minorities subject
to the plan was directly from Fullilove SeeFullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1980) (listing
some minority groups, such as Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts, which are not present in Richmond
in significant numbers).
65. Id.at 490.
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established in prior cases better serves the values of stare decisis than
would following a more recently decided case inconsistent with the
decisions that came before it; the latter course would simply compound the error ..... 66
The meaning and import of stare decisis are hard to grasp after this
passage.' If stare decidsis has any significance at all, it would seem to
be that decisions with which the currentJustices disagree have some
authoritative or binding effect. Stated another way, stare decisis would
be meaningless if its strictures are limited to following cases with
Yet, the Court in Adarand
which the current majority agrees.'
explicitly states that it is appropriate to skip a precedent it does not
agree with as long as there is some older precedent with which it
agrees (which there usually is).69 An appropriate formal name for
the principle as so modified might be stare decisis quod omitti.7 °
Miller v. Johnson7' is the most significant, for present purposes, of
the three new decisions because it raises the same issues as Shaw
without the bizarre-shaped district so emphasized by the Court.
Georgia sent its first African American since Reconstruction to
Congress in 1972 and got its first majority-black district in 1981 after
a district court refused to approve the latest in a series of reapportionment schemes that had no majority-black district.72 When Georgia
received an additional, eleventh seat as a result of the 1990 Census,
The
the legislature created a second majority-black district.7
Department of Justice rejected that plan, suggesting that three
majority-black districts would be closer to the appropriate proportions
of the population and the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.74
The Georgia General Assembly, declining the option to go to court

66. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097, 2115 (1995). The Court cited as
support only Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).

67. While stare deisis and judicial restraint are commonly thought to be conservative
principles, neither conservatives nor liberals have followed either. See generally KAIRYS, WITH
LIBERTIY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME, supranote 3; David Kairys, Legal Reasoning,in THE POL1TICS OF
LAW (David Kairys ed., 1st ed. 1982).
68. This sort of statement would surely cause a scandal if uttered by a liberal justice. See
generally KAIRYS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME, supra note 3.
69. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2115 (stating that "adherence to precedent is not rigidly
required in constitutional cases" as long as departure can be justified).
70. I asked Monsignor Michael Doyle, Pastor of the Church of the Sacred Heart in Camden,
New Jersey, a friend with knowledge of Latin, to translate into Latin "stand by prior decisions
but you can skip the ones you don't agree with." He provided the following approximation:
staredeisis quod omitti potes si cum eo non consentis. I propose the short form stare deisis quod
omitt.
71. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
72. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2483-84 (1995).
73. I&
74. Id.
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to obtain preclearance for the plan with two majority-black districts,
adopted a plan that had three majority-black districts.'
None of
these majority-black districts was bizarrely shaped. 6
The Court acknowledged what it refused to see or acknowledge in
Shazw--that the reapportionment measure was not an explicitly racial
classification, and therefore presented a circumstantial case.77
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy concluded for the Court that this
reapportionment was also unconstitutional "racial stereotyping"
because it was "'unexplainable on grounds other than race"' 78 and
"race was the predominant factor."79 The Court based this conclusion on two findings: that the Georgia legislature "deliberately" drew
the boundaries of the majority-black districts to create black majorities, which, the Court said, was alone a "quite compelling" basis for
unconstitutionality;8 0 and that under pressure from the Department
ofJustice, the legislature created three, instead of two, majority-black
districts.8 "
Both of these findings are, of course, indisputably true, but they are
also explainable in terms so benign and typical as to seem trite. Race
was not the sole or predominant criteria if one considers the
legislature's entire plan. The legislature protected the incumbents
of both parties and made the usual assortment of very deliberate
trade-offs and deals involving Democrats and Republicans and the
range of groups and interests in the state. After all, eight of the
eleven districts were majority-white. 2 Race was the "predominant"
factor and the result is "unexplainable" except based on race only if
one's focus is limited" to the white people in majority-black districts
who wound up for the first time represented in Congress by African
Americans.8'

75. Id
76. Id. at 2489. The Court notes what it regards as some unusual characteristics, without
comparing the shape of these districts to the range of districts around the country, but concedes
that none of these districts is bizarre. Id.
77. Id at 2483.
78. Id. at 2483,2487 (quodngArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Auth., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977)).
79. Id. at 2488.
80. Id. at 2489.
81. Id. at 2488-90.
82. Id. at 2488-89.
83. The limited focus is also apparent in the Court's discussion of standing and the alleged
harm to the plaintiffs. Id. at 2488-90; see supra note 35.

84. The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that three, rather than two, majority
African-American districts were created, although three black members on the Georgia
delegation do not overrepresent African Americans. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488-90.
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Further, deliberately drawing district boundaries to achieve a
desired racial outcome is not at all unusual-common would describe
it best. Politicians participating in redistricting regularly and quite
deliberately consider race when drawing lines, and race is commonly
a "predominant" concern in drawing the lines of many districts. For
example, conservative Republicans have recently favored the creation
of a small number of majority-black districts, deliberately drawing the
lines so as to maximize the number of black voters in these districts.8 5 Their reasoning is based on a political calculation that is far
from color-blind: African Americans vote Democratic by an overwhelming proportion, so the Republicans wind up with more seats if
black votes are concentrated in a small number of districts rather than
providing the Democrats with a cushion of black votes in many
districts.
Deliberately drawing redistricting lines predominantly based on race
is also a fair description of precisely what Georgia and North Carolina
did to create all white-majority districts before the Voting Rights Act.
Race was more "predominant" than in Miller in the sense that it
influenced the lines of all the districts. Yet, when whites rigged
apportionment plans and electoral schemes to continue the
disempowerment of blacks after they won the right to vote, there was
no discussion by the Court of "separating voters," "segregating
citizens," 86 or "political apartheid.""7 Rather, in the leading case of
the current conservative era, City of Mobile v. Bolden,8 s the Court
required a higher, virtually impossible level of proof of purposeful
racist action as a pre-condition to any serious scrutiny.8 9 In such
cases, blacks were disadvantaged, so benign non-racial purposes and
government interests needed only be asserted to defeat discrimination
claims. When whites are seen by the Court as disadvantaged, the
"mere assertion"9 of necessity, as the MillerCourt said, is insufficient.
Further, when whites are disadvantaged, if race is "predominant,"

85. See Mellow v. Mitchell, 607 A.2d 204,208 (Pa. 1992) (discussing use of districts to "dilute
minority voter strength"). SeeJeffrey Rosen, Southem Comfort, NEW REPUBUC, Jan. 8 & 15, 1996,
at 4 (stating that "cynical alliance" between conservative Republicans and black Democrats
created large number of majority black districts following 1990 Census, deprived Democrats of
black votes across range of districts, and greatly increased Republican proportion of House
delegations from southern states).
86. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
87. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
88. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
89. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (stating that state action that is racially
neutral on its face violates Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment only if "motivated by
discriminatory purpose").
90. Miler, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.
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which the Court had to admit is a "difficult" line to draw, there is no
need for judicial restraint and the Court's usual deference to an
administrative agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate is
suspended.9 2
The deeply contradictory approaches are particularly evident in the
majority's discussion in Miller of its racial "stereotyp[ing]" conclusion. 3 Redistricting to provide more (rather than less or the same)
representativeness embodies the "offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, 'think
alike."'9 4 The logic seems to be this: it is inappropriate to remedy
the longstanding disempowerment of African Americans, which was
based on reprehensible stereotyping and demeaning of them (and
implemented by the consistent practice of white-bloc voting), because
to do so would stereotype and demean them. In other words, African
Americans should be denied relief because recognizing their rights
and establishing electoral plans that enable them to elect even a
token number of black candidates demeans and stereotypes African
Americans. In the terms of the dual system thesis, relief should be
denied to the "advantaged" group (more precisely as to African
Americans, the group that had been unfairly disadvantaged) because
it would stereotype and demean them. No such thinking even
appears in the cases in which whites are advantaged.
The conservative majority is creating what appears to be a white
constitutional right not to be represented by an African American as
a result of redistricting under the Voting Rights Act, and thereby
essentially invalidating the Act. They have not explained what is
constitutionally repugnant about using the same means as politicians
regularly use-deliberate jockeying and compromise in which race
and a range of other factors play a major role-to achieve some
significant degree of racial representativeness, rather than, as was and
continues to be the common practice, to suppress black representa-

91.

Id.

92.

See id. at 2491; cf Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991) (holding thatjudges should

defer to administrative agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate); Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 838 (1985) (holding that decision as to whether agency's refusal to institute
proceedings is judicially reviewable is best left to Congress, not courts); Chevron v. National
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (stating that federal judges having no
constituency have duty to respect policy choices made by agencies who do).
93. See Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2486 (asserting that when state assigns voters on basis of race
these race-based assignments "'embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their
race'" (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting))).
94. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 115 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993)).
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tion and power well below the levels of their proportion of the
population.
THE DUAL SYSTEM: UNEXPLAINABLE ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN
RACE

The Court has decided enough cases in each of the three main
categories of equal protection decisions to summarize the major
differences in the two sets of rules, assumptions, and approaches.
Such a summary is set forth in table form on the next page. These
cases also provide the basis for an understanding of how, using what
is easily described as a single set of equality rules, the conservative
majority has erected a dual system.
The structure of the purposeful discrimination framework and
analysis makes purpose the focus and establishes the content and
extent of what might be called pre-scrutiny scrutiny as the most significant-arguably the only significant-variable. Resolution of all the
important questions and the outcome depend on the determination
of whether the Court will engage in strict scrutiny. If it does, the
measure is invalid; if it does not, the measure will not be subject to
any serious questioning or analysis and will be upheld.95
The only exception is Korematsu v. United States9" and its companion cases upholding the imprisonment of all persons of Japanese
ancestry on the west coast during World War IYV Although the
Court in Korematsu said it was engaging in strict scrutiny, it did not
apply a scrutiny we would now call strict. In fact, the decision is based
on an extreme version of the purposeful discrimination rule: even
though the measure singled out explicitly by race the persons
punished without trial or charges, the Court concluded it was not
purposeful discrimination because the purpose was national security.
This analysis is an extreme form of what I call the purpose doctrine
that now dominates civil rights and civil liberties decisions.98

95. In some recent decisions, Justice O'Connor has suggested a less stringent view of
"compelling" that would result in upholding some measures subjected to strict scrutiny. See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097,2117 (1995); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. 323 U.S. 214 (1994).
97. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1994).
98.

See KAIRYS,WITH LIBERTY ANDJUSTICE FOR SOME, supra note 3,at 183-87 (suggesting that

purpose should be irrelevant).
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Comparison of Conservative Era Discrimination Cases
in which Blacks and Whites Were Disadvantaged*
Blacks Disadvantaged

Whites Disadvantaged

Usual basis for equal
protection claim

disadvantage measured by at
least a concrete disparity*-1

affirmative or remedial
action, sometimes without a
concrete disparity
or
,
disadvantage!"

Criteria for plaintiff's
standing to sue

actual, substantial interest at
stake required'

perceived disadvantage
sufficient4

Government's purported
interest furthered by
challenged measure

accept as stated, with
minimal or no question'

questioned, with
presumption of racism'

Plaintiff's burden of proof

near impossible'

minimalb

Appearance of discrimination or stereotyping

irrelevant (and trivialized)'

sufficient basis for claimd

Claimed benign purpose

sufficient to defeat claim'

irrelevant6

Proof of a pretext used to
hide discrimination

ignored'

sufficient basis for claimd

Level of scrutiny

minimal or none'

searching and strice

Pre-scrutiny scrutiny

minimal or none'

searching and strictb

Stare decisis:
-Precedents deny relief
-Precedents grant relief

binding
optional'

optional'
binding'

"Demeaning" effect on
"advantaged" group3

irrelevant (or presumptively
nonexistent)'

sufficient basis for claim"

Judicial role

restraint'

activism6

Moral stance

skepticism'

repudiation b

Rhetorical style

legal bland'

lively, indignant, analogies
to worst forms of racism'

Issue

2

*Authorities (full citations supra): a. McCleskey v. Kemp, Memphis v. Greene, Mobile v. Bolden, Arlington
Hghts. v. Metro. Hous. Devel. Corp.; Washington v. Davis; b. Richmond v. Croson, Shaw v. Reno, Adarand v. Pena,
Miller v. Johnson; c. Allen v. Wright; d. Shaw v. Reno, Miller v. Johnson; e. Adarand v. Pens. Numbered notes: 1.
*Disparity" refers to a group having less than its proportion of the relevant population or disparate treatment that is
punitive or exclusionary. 2. "Pre-scrutiny scrutiny" refers to the content and intensity of scrutiny before the determination
of the appropriate level of scrutiny. 3. 'Demeaning refers to the insulting and dependency-producing effect on an
advantaged group of receiving an advantage, even where the "advantage" is simply a remedy for a past wrong.
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In the vast and undefined pre-scrutiny scrutiny space, 99 judges
explore, without any stated limits on content or intensity of analysis
or any consistency, the meaning of racism and discrimination, the
appropriate goals of equality, the credibility of the actors, the social
worth of various measures, the government's actual and conceivable
interests and purposes, and so on.
The Court articulated some standards or criteria for determining
what proof establishes a circumstantial case of purposeful discrimination in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Authority'°°-which set out the standard relied on in Shaw and Miller,
"unexplainable on grounds other than race."' 1 Justice Powell's
majority opinion rejected any search for "'dominant' or 'primary"'
purposes as elusive. 02 Because of the particular constitutional and
social importance of racial discrimination, judicial deference should
cease and a plaintiffs burden of proof should be met when a
discriminatory purpose has been shown to be "a motivating factor." 0 3 This is not established by disproportionate impact alone
unless there is "a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race.""° Otherwise, a court should consider a range of factors that
include, "without purporting to be exhaustive:" (1) the historical
background, "particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken
for invidious purposes;" (2) the "sequence of events;" (3) "departures"
from usual procedures or substantive decisions; and (4) legislative and
administrative history. 5
The attempt to develop or use standards, however, was quickly
abandoned. Greene cites Arlington Heights,"6 but the Court rejected
the black plaintiffs' claim without considering the specific indicia of
discrimination set out in Arlington Heights, although all or almost all
of them were present. Shaw and Miller reach the "unexplainable"
conclusion without discussing specific standards or criteria, although
there was not any disproportionate impact or invidious pattern and
the white plaintiffs did not and could not present the kinds of proof
set out in Arlington Heights.

99. When the Court decides to exercise strict scrutiny, this analysis spills over into the
scrutiny space.
100. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
101. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Auth., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
102.

l& at 265.

103. Id. at 266.
104. Id. (explaining that discriminatory purpose can only be discovered through inquiry into
circumstantial and direct evidence of interest).
105. I& at 267-69.
106. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119 (1981) (citing Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Auth., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
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The conservative majority has used the pre-scrutiny scrutiny space
to articulate and enforce a vision of equality and American society
that is familiar in the politics of our time. Color-blindness is the key
word, invoking the notion and vision, which only an overt racist could
reject, of a society free of racial discrimination. This is not presented
as an abstract goal, however; it is supposed to happen now, in current
society.
If we examine that goal and the state of our nation as we approach
the twenty-first century, real equality in the current context is an
illusion.'
De jure discrimination has been eliminated and progress
has been made, but enforcement of antidiscrimination rules to
eliminate the effects of slavery, second-class citizenship, and entrenched discrimination proceeded systematically for only a decade or
two (before the conservative purposeful discrimination analysis was
adopted)."'s The process of integrating African Americans into the
economy and social life of the nation started with great promise, but
it quickly stalled and may stop completely.
Perhaps the hallmark of our time is the use of the ideal of colorblindness as a non-racist symbol and rationalization for halting and
reversing the process of integration of African Americans into the
economy and society. In the cruelest of ironies, color-blindness has
become a code word not for inclusion or integration-words and
ideas not heard much lately-but for the separation and segregation
that increasingly characterize American society as we move toward
what looks like a developing American apartheid. This is not a
reaction or response to equality that has gone too far, but to the first
substantial entry in our history of African Americans into the
economy and social life of the nation.
And the vision is not non-racial. In base terms, the vision disguised
by color-blindness, along with the other favorite catchwords of our
time, "free market" and "dependency," is of a society in which people
value only themselves and those close to or like them, glorify greed,
and receive essential resources and services only to the extent they
can individually pay for them-as we dismantle basic public services,
abandon the concern and respect for others that makes us human,

107. SeeANDREW HACKER, TWo NATIONS 3-16 (1992) (discussing prevalence of awareness of
distinction between races and role of awareness in "[d] ividing American [s]ociety").
108. SeeKAiRYS, WITH LIBERIYANDJUSTICE FOR SOME, supranote 3, at 129-31 (acknowledging
that "institutional forms of racism" have been eradicated, but identifying purposeful
discrimination doctrine as "hallmark of the conservative judicial approach"and impediment to
serious examination of governmental actions, even when such action is clearly harmful to
minorities). This affected interpretations of civil rights laws, like Title VII, as well as the
Constitution.
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and retreat into enclaves, increasingly self-contained, walled and
defined by race and class."°
The logic of the times subsumes not only compassion but common
sense: Helping people in the growing bottom segment of the
economic and social ladder used to make sense, because it reduces
suffering and provides some opportunity by at least maintaining a
minimal level of subsistence; then we noticed that poverty did not
disappear, which must mean that helping people in need does not
really help; now we seem convinced that helping actually does harm.
The economy and the American nation have undergone farreaching economic and social changes on the national and international levels, leaving many who thought of themselves as securely in
the middle class without security or work; a substantial and growing
portion of our people without a place in the economy, meaningful
social connection, or hope; and widespread conflict and confusion
about the meaning of work, family, life, and country. But we cannot
seem to grasp that these changes-and our response or lack of
response to them-are at the core of the deep economic, social, and
cultural disruption so evident in everyday life. Instead of facing this
crisis, by, for example, debating and deciding how to minimize and
share the pain, we have chosen to focus on and blame those who have
suffered the most and the understandably incomplete and insufficient
attempts by government to help. Community and society, as well as
equality, seem to have lost all meaning.

109. See The Serene Fortress: A Special Report; Many Seek Security in Private Communities, N.Y.
closed communities that privatize public
spaces and sacrifice diversity and community and noting that largely conservative residents are
not bothered by high taxes and overbearing regulations, including gun control and strict
environment restrictions). There are already more private security guards than police, and we
imprison a higher proportion of our people than any other nation. See Ron Galperin, Gated
Communities on Rise in Number and Popularity, LA TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at A14; Howard
Goodman, U.S.JailRate Still Tops World, PHIiA. INQUnER, Feb. 11, 1992, atA3; Amy Kaslow, The
High Cost of Crime, CHMMAN SC. MONUrOR, May 9, 1994.

TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, at 1 (discussing trend toward

